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The Effect of Customer Empowerment on Adherence to Expert Advice  
 
Abstract 
Customers often receive expert advice related to their health, finances, taxes or legal 
procedures, to name just a few. A noble stance taken by some is that experts should empower 
customers to make their own decisions. In this article, we distinguish informational from 
decisional empowerment and study whether empowerment leads customers to adhere more or 
less to expert advice. We empirically test our model using a unique dataset involving 11,735 
respondents in 17 countries on four continents. In  the  context  of  consumer  adherence  to  doctors’ 
therapy advice (patient non-adherence to doctor advice may cost about $564 billion globally to 
the pharmaceutical industry every year), we find that decisional empowerment lowers adherence 
to expert advice. The effect of informational empowerment varies predictably across cultures and 
is only universally beneficial when initiated by the customer. These findings have important 
implications for professional service providers. 
 
Keywords: Relationship; services marketing; expert services; professional services; advice-
taking, advice-giving, adherence to expert advice; empowerment; delegation; international 
marketing research; cross-cultural studies; health marketing; consumer behavior.
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1. Introduction 
Customers often rely on experts, such as accountants, consultants, lawyers and physicians to 
make complex decisions (Bove & Johnson, 2006). Expert advice decreases decision complexity 
(Brehmer & Hagafors, 1986) and may improve decision quality (Yaniv, 2004). There is a rich 
literature, in marketing and psychology, on customer-expert interactions. One stream of literature 
focuses  on  how  experts  use  customers’  input  and  feedback  to  update  their  beliefs  and  decisions  
(e.g. Camacho, Donkers, & Stremersch, 2011; Narayanan & Manchanda, 2008). For instance, 
Camacho, Donkers and Stremersch (2011) show that, when learning about a new drug, 
physicians place more emphasis on feedback from patients who switch to alternative treatments 
than on feedback from patients who continue their therapy. A second stream of literature focuses 
on expert advice and customer adherence to such advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Bowman, 
Heilman, & Seetharaman, 2004; Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004; Schwartz, Luce & Ariely, 2011; 
Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012; Usta & Häubl, 2011). The present paper focuses on the effects of 
customer empowerment during an advising interaction on customer adherence to expert advice. 
In a typical customer-expert interaction, a customer receives an advice from the expert 
and subsequently decides whether to adhere to such advice1. A robust finding from this literature 
is that people do not sufficiently adhere to expert advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). The 
traditional view of customer-expert interactions is that the expert should choose a particular 
course of action on behalf of the customer (e.g.  “I  would  advise  you  to  do  X”,  see  Bonnacio  &  
Dalal, 2006, p.128), a decision-making  style  we  call  “paternalistic” (e.g. Charles, Gafni & 
                                                 
1 We assume a setting where the customer seeks the advice of a single expert and that customer adherence to the 
expert’s  advice  improves  decision  quality  for  the  customer.  This  assumption  builds  upon  the  advice-taking literature 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004).  
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Wheelan, 1999). For example, a paternalistic lawyer-client interaction proceeds with a client 
exposing a legal problem to her lawyer who then recommends a particular course of action to the 
client (Macfarlane, 2008). The lawyer then expects the client to follow her advice to maximize 
chances of successful litigation.  
This traditional view of customer-expert decision-making stands in sharp contrast to the 
increasing influence or empowerment of the customer (Camacho, 2014; Camacho, Landsman, & 
Stremersch, 2010; Fuchs, Prandelli & Schreier, 2010; Macfarlane, 2008; Rapp et al. 2006). 
Empowerment refers to strategies or mechanisms that equip people with sufficient knowledge 
and autonomy to allow them to exert control over a certain decision (Ozer & Bandura, 1990). 
Empowerment occurs when, instead of merely sharing diagnostic information – i.e. information 
that  allows  the  expert  to  understand  the  customer’s  problem  - the expert and the customer discuss 
additional solution-relevant information. That is, information about alternative courses of action 
(e.g.  “there  are  two  possible  courses  of  action:  option  X  and  option  Y”), their pros and cons (e.g. 
“the  downside  of  option  X  is…”)  or their fit with the  customer’s  own preferences  (“I  believe  
option  Y  may  fit  you  well  because…”). Finally, empowerment also occurs when instead of 
recommending a single course of action the expert concludes the interaction by leaving the final 
choice of a course of action in the hands of the customer (e.g. “we discussed options X and Y, 
please make your informed choice”). 
Therefore, we distinguish between two different forms of customer empowerment. 
Informational empowerment occurs when the customer and the expert share solution-relevant 
information. Decisional empowerment occurs when the expert leaves the final decision to the 
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customer2. We organize customer-expert decision-making models, according to these dimensions 
of empowerment, which is new to the literature.  
Recent views suggest that customer empowerment leads to better outcomes because it 
satisfies customers’ need for autonomy and self-esteem (Usta & Häubl, 2011). One of these 
accredited outcomes is increased customer adherence to expert advice (Loh et al., 2007; 
Macfarlane, 2008). However, despite an increasing number of advocates of customer 
empowerment in customer-expert interactions (Epstein, Alper & Quill, 2004; Macfarlane, 2008), 
there is limited empirical research on how customer empowerment influences customer 
adherence to expert advice.  
The present paper develops theoretical expectations on the relationship between 
empowerment and adherence, grounded in two theoretical traditions: dual models of information 
processing (Chaiken, 1980; Petty, & Cacioppo, 1986) and customer overconfidence (See et al., 
2011; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Connected to these two 
theoretical mechanisms, we distinguish between two different forms of non-adherence to expert 
advice, namely unintentional and reasoned non-adherence.  Unintentional non-adherence occurs 
when a customer inadvertently fails to follow the  expert’s  advice (e.g. due to forgetfulness or 
misunderstanding of the advice). Reasoned non-adherence occurs when a customer deliberately 
decides to deviate from the expert’s  advice. 
We challenge the view that customer empowerment may only increase adherence to 
expert advice and provide rich empirical evidence in support of this view. We argue that 
                                                 
2 In line with the advice-taking literature (see e.g. Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), the expert advisor merely provides a 
recommendation, so effectively the final decision always lies with the customer. Even if the customer has the legal 
right and responsibility to make the final decision, the expert can still decide to advise a single course of action. 
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empowerment may decrease, rather than increase, adherence for two reasons. First, informational 
empowerment, when not explicitly requested by the customer, may increase the cognitive and 
emotional burden for customers (Quill & Brody, 1996), and impair information processing, 
which results in higher unintentional non-adherence. Similarly, decisional empowerment may 
magnify the cognitive and emotional costs of the decision task (Botti & McGill, 2011), resulting 
in worse information processing and higher unintentional non-adherence.  
Second, decisional empowerment, and to a lesser extent unrequested informational 
empowerment, may trigger customer overconfidence. Customer overconfidence may increase 
both unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. On the one hand, overconfident customers tend 
to listen less carefully to expert advice (Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012), which increases 
unintentional non-adherence. On the other hand, overconfident customers tend to egocentrically 
discount  the  expert’s  advice  (See  et  al.  2011,  Yaniv,  2004),  which increases reasoned non-
adherence.  
Using a multi-sample Bayesian structural equation model, we show that decisional 
empowerment is associated with higher unintentional and reasoned non-adherence to expert 
advice and that informational empowerment is only able to reduce unintentional and reasoned 
non-adherence when the customer explicitly requests the exchange of additional solution-
relevant information. We empirically validate our expectations in the highly relevant domain of 
healthcare decisions. Consumer non-adherence to doctor advice contributes to disease 
progression and increased mortality rates, resulting in annual direct and indirect healthcare costs 
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of at least $290 billion in the U.S. alone (New England Healthcare Institute, 2009) and lost 
revenue for pharmaceutical firms of $564 billion a year globally (Forissier & Firlik, 2012) 3.  
Our sample includes 11,735 respondents in 17 countries on four continents. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is by far the largest and geographically most diverse test of the relationship 
between customer empowerment and adherence to date. Prior empirical research on the 
relationship between empowerment and adherence to expert advice has focused on the U.S. or a 
selected  set  of  Western  nations,  while  customers’  reaction to empowerment may be vastly 
different across cultures (Botti, Orfali & Iyengar, 2009; Charles et al., 2006).  
We build upon Schwartz’s  (1994) cultural values theory, to explain systematic cross-
country differences in the relationship between customer empowerment and adherence to expert 
advice. Our analyses revealed that, in line with our expectations, culture matters. We find that 
culture moderates the effects of decisional empowerment and, to a lesser extent, of informational 
empowerment on non-adherence in systematic and predictable ways. These findings have 
important implications for marketers and policy makers. 
2. Theoretical Background: Customer Empowerment and Adherence to Expert Advice 
The expert advice literature typically distinguishes between advice-giving and advice-taking 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv, 2004). We first organize advice-giving styles according to 
customer empowerment. Next, we discuss advice-taking, which, in our context, is the  customer’s  
decision  to  adhere  or  deviate  from  the  expert’s  advice.  
                                                 
3 See https://www.adherence564.com/. 
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2.1. Organizing Advice-Giving Styles According to Customer Empowerment 
Figure 1 organizes different advice-giving styles, according to informational empowerment, 
through expert facilitation (x-axis) or customer initiative (y-axis), and decisional empowerment 
(the z-axis). Expert facilitation of informational empowerment happens when the expert 
proactively exchanges solution-relevant information with the customer (i.e. takes the initiative of 
sharing solution-relevant information even if it is not requested by the customer). Customer-
initiated informational empowerment happens when the customer requests solution-relevant 
information from the expert. Under decisional empowerment, the customer retains autonomy 
over the decision, which is the opposite of decision delegation by the customer to the expert (see 
Usta & Häubl, 2011). 
The advice-giving styles at the bottom of Figure 1 are characterized by low decisional 
empowerment (i.e. choice delegation), while those at the top are characterized by high decisional 
empowerment (i.e. choice autonomy). 
--- Insert Figure 1 around here --- 
In the bottom left of the graph, we depict the traditional paternalistic model which is 
characterized by low decisional empowerment and by low informational empowerment (Charles, 
Gafni & Wheelan, 1999). In a paternalistic model, the expert decides on behalf of the customer 
in a paternalistic manner and hence only needs to exchange the information needed to identify 
and understand the customer’s problem (diagnostic information). In informed delegation models, 
customers and experts also exchange solution-relevant information. Conditional on the 
information collected, the expert then applies her knowledge to choose an option that maximizes 
the customer’s  utility (Phelps, 1992). 
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At the top of Figure 1, we depict consumerist and informed autonomy models. In 
consumerist models (Coulter, 1999), the customer demands that the expert helps her execute a 
self-chosen course of action and there is no exchange of solution-relevant information. Examples 
of consumerism include requests for a specific litigation strategy by clients to their lawyers 
(Macfarlane, 2008) and branded request by patients to their doctors (Venkataraman & 
Stremersch, 2007), a phenomenon that has steadily increased in recent years (Stremersch, 
Landsman, & Venkataraman, 2013). To the extent that the customer takes initiative in 
exchanging solution-relevant information during her interaction with the expert, consumerism 
can yield customer-driven informed autonomy (Charles, Gafni & Whelan, 1999). In the expert-
driven informed autonomy model (Quill & Brody, 1996), the expert facilitates the exchange of 
solution-relevant information, but leaves the final choice of a course of action to the customer.  
2.2. Advice-Taking: Customer Adherence to Expert Advice 
We conceptualize adherence to expert advice as the propensity of a customer to follow an 
expert’s  advice  (Bonaccio  &  Dalal,  2006;;  DiMatteo  et  al.,  1993). Adherence to expert advice 
requires an effortful commitment of the customer to implement the behaviors recommended by 
the expert during the advising interaction. If customers have difficulty to understand or recall 
some of the information transmitted by the expert (e.g., the different steps a tax advisor 
recommended his client to minimize her tax payments), they may unintentionally non-adhere to 
the advice. If customers do not accept and deliberately deviate from the  expert’s  advice  (and rely 
more  on  their  own  opinion  than  on  the  expert’s  opinion), we speak of reasoned non-adherence 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).  
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3. Hypotheses Development 
In developing hypotheses about the effects of customer empowerment on adherence to expert 
advice, we rely on two key psychological mechanisms: (1) dual models of information 
processing (Chaiken, 1980; Petty, & Cacioppo, 1986) and (2) customer overconfidence (See et 
al., 2011; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).  
Dual models of information processing, such as the heuristic systematic model (HSM; 
Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) and the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) posit that customers possibly engage in two modes of information 
processing, which involve different levels of thought and cognitive effort. Heuristic (or 
peripheral) processing is relatively effortless and quick while systematic (or central) processing 
requires customers to devote more cognitive resources to process information. A good example, 
in a healthcare context, is provided by Steginga and Occhipinti (2004) who show, for patients 
with prostate cancer, that customers may either use an expert opinion heuristic (e.g. “experts  can  
be trusted”, p.574) or more systematic information processing strategies (e.g. weighing all pros 
and cons of different recommended options). For these reasons, dual-process models have 
special relevance for the effects of informational empowerment on unintentional non-adherence. 
Recent research in social psychology suggests that empowerment may lead people to feel 
more powerful in a relationship and become overconfident about their abilities (See et al., 2011). 
Overconfident customers tend to overweight their own knowledge and opinions and therefore: (i) 
listen less carefully to expert advice (Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012) and (ii) egocentrically 
discount expert advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; See et al. 2011, Yaniv, 2004). Moreover, when 
given power in a certain decision task, people tend to generalize their overconfidence to tasks 
outside the original scope of empowerment (Weitlauf et al., 2001). Hence, customer 
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overconfidence has special relevance for the effects of decisional empowerment on non-
adherence and for the effects of informational empowerment on reasoned non-adherence.  
3.1. Expert Facilitation of Informational Empowerment and Customer Non-Adherence 
Expert facilitation occurs when an expert proactively exchanges solution-relevant information 
with the customer during an advising interaction (e.g. a doctor asks a child whether she likes 
strawberries  or  cherries  to  decide  on  a  drug’s  flavor  to  prescribe, or a lawyer discusses with a 
client which expert witness to appoint in a patent litigation case). Experts often exchange 
unrequested solution-relevant information with customers in order to increase the customer’s  
involvement and responsibility in a given decision-making task (Epstein, Alper & Quill, 2004). 
Dual-process models predict that elevated responsibility increases task importance and thus 
motivates customers to use systematic, rather than heuristic, information processing (Bohner et 
al. 1995; Chaiken, 1980). However, systematic processing of unrequested pieces of information 
may increase  customers’  cognitive  and  emotional  burden  and  eventually  obscure  other  relevant 
pieces of information (Epstein, Korones, & Quill, 2010).  
Thus, when compared with a paternalistic model, expert facilitation of informational 
empowerment requires the customer to systematically process additional solution-relevant 
information. Such additional information will compete,  in  the  customer’s  memory, with other 
key pieces of information in  the  expert’s  advice (e.g. dosing instructions in a patient-physician 
interaction or advice on specific litigation steps in a lawyer-client interaction), making the latter 
less salient and the advice harder to recall4 (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992), as compared to a 
                                                 
4 Experts may write down their advice to facilitate customer recall. Still, customers often unintentionally deviate 
from written advice. Morris and Halperin (1979), for example, find that written doctor advice increases adherence to 
short-term, but not long-term, therapy advice and only if the written  advice  is  “sufficiently  attractive,  easy-to-read, 
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paternalistic interaction. Forgetting, in turn, is one of the key reasons why customers do not 
adhere to expert advice (Osterberg & Blaschke, 2005). Thus, we expect that: 
H1: Expert facilitation of informational empowerment increases unintentional non-adherence.  
Customers  often  suffer,  in  their  relationship  with  advisors,  from  “egocentric  bias”,  i.e.  
from  a  tendency  to  overweight  their  own  opinion  and  egocentrically  discount  the  expert’s  advice  
(Bonnacio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). This means that even when a customer 
accepts that the  expert’s  advice  is  correct, she may still depart from this advice and maintain her 
own prior attitudes and beliefs, resulting in reasoned non-adherence (Bonnacio & Dalal, 2006). 
Expert facilitation of informational empowerment may increase this tendency. When compared 
with a paternalistic model, expert facilitation of informational empowerment may elevate 
customers’  perceived power in the customer-expert relationship, i.e. the belief in their own 
ability to decide and control the problem being discussed (Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012). 
Customers with an elevated perceived power tend to become overconfident, which leads them to 
place more weight in their own beliefs and less weight in the expert’s  advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006; See et al. 2011, Yaniv, 2004). Therefore, expert facilitation of informational empowerment 
may trigger customers to egocentrically discount the expert' advice more than a paternalistic 
customer-expert interaction. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H2: Expert facilitation of informational empowerment increases reasoned non-adherence. 
                                                 
and  ‘directive’”  (p.48).  Similarly,  Weinman  (1990)  argues  that,  on  top  of  the  adequacy  of  the  written  information,  
patients are only more likely to recall written doctor advice when such advice meets their needs. 
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3.2.  Customer-Initiated Informational Empowerment and Customer Non-Adherence 
Customer-initiated informational empowerment results in the discussion of solution-relevant 
information that the customer finds self-relevant and meaningful. Prior research in dual-process 
models shows that high self-relevance triggers systematic information processing (Chaiken, 
1980). Systematic processing of self-relevant information should  increase  customers’  motivation 
to carefully listen to the advice (Ryan & Deci, 2000), which, in turn, facilitates understanding 
and recall of the information exchanged. For instance, Kreuter et al. (1999) show that cognitive 
elaboration focused on self-relevant information facilitates understanding and future recall of 
health-related advice. Similarly, Brug et al. (1996) find that people who receive nutrition advice 
customized to their personal dietary behavior perceive such advice as self-relevant and adhere 
more to advice than people who receive non-tailored advice. In line with this logic, Abele and 
Gendolla (2007) show that active exercisers process health information focusing on physical 
exercise more deeply, and recall it better, than non-active exercisers. Thus, we expect that: 
H3: Customer-initiated informational empowerment decreases unintentional non-adherence. 
Customer-initiated informational empowerment may also affect reasoned non-adherence. 
When compared with a paternalistic model, customer-initiated informational empowerment may 
affect the distribution of perceived power between the customer and the expert in different ways. 
The effect thereof on reasoned non-adherence is unclear. On the one hand, it may be possible 
that the customer gains power in the customer-expert relationship. This happens if the customer 
discovers,  in  the  expert’s  response to her request for solution-relevant information, evidence that 
contradicts the expert’s  advice (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Contradictory information 
enables the customer to challenge the validity of the expert advice, which may increase the 
customer’s  perceived power relative to the expert.  
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On the other hand, it may also be conceivable that the expert gains power in the 
customer-expert  relationship.  For  instance,  the  expert  may  push  back  the  customer’s  initiative  
and refuse to discuss solution-relevant information. When compared with a paternalistic 
interaction,  an  expert’s  refusal  to  respond to  a  customer’s  requests  for  additional  information  
avoids the increase in perceived power, and subsequent customer overconfidence, discussed 
above (Izraeli & Jick, 1986). Alternatively, the expert may, through skillfully answering the 
questions posed by the customer, increase her expert status and undermine customer 
overconfidence.  
Hence, when compared to a paternalistic interaction, customer-initiated informational 
empowerment  may  increase,  or  decrease,  the  customer’s  tendency  to  egocentrically  discount the 
expert’s  advice  (Yaniv  &  Kleinberger,  2000).  Given  these  conflicting  expectations,  the ultimate 
effect of customer-initiated informational empowerment on reasoned non-adherence will depend 
on which of these two forces dominates and is, thus, an empirical question. 
3.3. Decisional Empowerment and Therapy Non-Adherence 
Decisional empowerment may increase unintentional non-adherence in two main ways. First, 
decisional empowerment may trigger customer overconfidence and worse information 
processing. Decisional empowerment allows customers to feel in control of their decisions, and 
increases their power in the customer-expert relationship (Botti & McGill, 2011). As discussed 
above, power may trigger overconfidence (See et al., 2011). Hence, when compared with a 
paternalistic model, decisional empowerment should lead customers to overestimate the accuracy 
of their beliefs and opinions, which leads them to listen and process the expert advice less 
carefully (Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012). Less careful processing of the advice increases the 
likelihood that the customer forgets components of the advice. 
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Second, decisional empowerment increases  the  customer’s  responsibility in decision-
making, potentially magnifying the emotional and cognitive costs of the decision task (Botti & 
McGill, 2011; Botti, Orfali & Iyengar, 2009). These effects may increase customer anxiety 
(Botti, Orfali & Iyengar, 2009), which, in turn, has been shown to impair information processing 
(Sengupta & Johar, 2001). Consequently, decisional empowerment impairs the quality of the 
customer-expert communication and reduces  the  salience  of  the  expert’s  advice  making  it  harder  
to recall later. We thus hypothesize: 
H4: Decisional empowerment increases unintentional non-adherence. 
Decisional empowerment may also increase the likelihood of reasoned non-adherence. 
When compared with expert facilitation of informational empowerment, decisional 
empowerment represents a stronger departure from the traditional paternalistic customer-expert 
relationship (Charles, Gafni & Whelan, 1999; Quill & Brody, 1996). In addition, decisional 
empowerment entails patient participation in the decision-making without necessarily allowing 
the customer to learn more about the problem under discussion. Hence, as discussed above, 
decisional empowerment may elevate customer power and trigger overconfidence, which should 
lead customers to place less weight on  the  expert’s  opinion  and  egocentrically discount the 
expert advice (See et al., 2011; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).  
In addition, overconfident customers tend to generalize their self-efficacy perceptions 
from a focal decision domain to decision domains outside the original scope of empowerment 
(Weitlauf et al., 2001). Accordingly, decisional empowerment during an advising interaction 
(e.g. participating in the choice of one out of several alternative courses of action) may lead 
customers to become overconfident about their capacity to decide when to alter or stop their 
adherence to expert advice, increasing reasoned non-adherence. In the words of Bowman, 
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Heilman and Seetharaman (2004), in the context of physicians empowering patients to make 
their own treatment choices, the “perception  of  empowerment  and  control  should  persist  such  
that the consumer also believes that he or she is capable of changing dosage or stopping usage 
altogether  without  physician  consultation”  (p.  325).  Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H5: Decisional empowerment increases reasoned non-adherence. 
3.4. Cultural Effects 
Behavioral responses to customer empowerment may be vastly different across different national 
cultures (Charles et al., 2006). In particular, we expect national-cultural values to shape 
expectations about the role of experts and to trigger positive or negative social reinforcement 
mechanisms that moderate the effects of customer empowerment on non-adherence. This fits the 
tradition in international marketing of considering national-cultural values as moderators of 
customer behavior (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006; Steenkamp & De Jong, 2010; Steenkamp & 
Geyskens, 2013; Stremersch & Tellis, 2004; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009; Tellis, Stremersch, 
& Yin, 2003; Van den Bulte & Stremersch, 2004; van Everdingen, Fok, & Stremersch, 2009).  
We adopt Schwartz’s  (1994)  framework  of national-cultural values, instead of alternative 
frameworks of Hofstede, Inglehart and Baker, or Triandis (see Vinken, Soeters & Ester, 2004, 
for an overview), for three key reasons. First, Schwartz derived his cultural dimensions from his 
individual-level theory of human value priorities (Schwartz, 1992), which is one of the most 
widely validated theories in social sciences (Schwartz et al., 2001). For this reason, Schwartz’s  
(1994) cultural framework is conceptually the most pure among existing theories of national-
cultural values (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006; Bond et al., 2004). 
Second, this framework is robust in terms of its measurement properties. The different 
value dimensions in this framework form an integrated and interdependent system, in contrast to 
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other frameworks in which cultural dimensions are orthogonal to each other (e.g. Hofstede, 
2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The cultural dimensions in Schwartz’s  (1994)  framework  are  
also clearly defined and operationalized a priori, in contrast to other frameworks that, ex post, 
infer cultural dimensions from correlations among diverse items and exploratory analyses (e.g. 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
Third, Schwartz’s  values  theory  explicitly addresses the distinction between the 
individual and nation-cultural levels of analysis. Scholars have recently challenged the notion of 
culture as a set of meanings and principles shared by most members of a certain society (Fischer 
& Schwartz, 2011). In contrast with other cultural theories, Schwartz’s conception of cultural 
values as a normative system that is external to individuals (but underlies the functioning of 
societal institutions) does not assume a high level of within-country consensus (Fischer & 
Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz, 2009, 2011).  
All the reasons above suggest that Schwartz’s  framework fits well with the topic of 
customer empowerment. Its bipolar dimensions capture opposing choices to three critical needs 
that confront most societies (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006; Schwartz, 2006). The first dimension 
relates to the need to organize the relations between the individual and the group. High-
autonomy cultures emphasize individuality, independence and self-expression. Affective 
autonomy cultures encourage individuals to act according to their own preferences. Intellectual 
autonomy cultures encourage individuals to develop their own opinions. In contrast, high-
embeddedness cultures emphasize social relationships, group identification, respect for tradition 
and obedience. 
The second dimension represents the need to guarantee responsible behaviors that protect 
the social fabric. There are two opposing ways to reach this goal. Egalitarian cultures tend to 
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instill socially responsible behavior by inducing people to see each other as moral equals and 
emphasizing equality and equal distribution of power. People in such societies tend to internalize 
cooperation and concern with others as a life-guiding principle. Hierarchical cultures rely on an 
unequal distribution of power and roles as a legitimate mechanism to guarantee behaviors that 
protect the social fabric.  
The third dimension relates to the need to manage the relations of people to society and 
the environment. High-mastery cultures emphasize success, daring and competence. High-
harmonious cultures emphasize the need to fit into the social and natural world and the 
importance of behaving in a way that is congruent with the social and natural environment.  
We expect culture to intensify or attenuate our hypothesized relationships for the effects 
of customer empowerment on non-adherence in three ways. First, as customers in high 
intellectual autonomy cultures are more inclined to pursue their own opinions independently, as 
compared with customers in low intellectual autonomy cultures (Schwartz, 2006), they should be 
more likely to become overconfident when exposed to expert facilitation of informational 
empowerment or decisional empowerment. In high-embeddedness cultures, in contrast, 
customers are less likely to engage in actions that may disrupt traditional roles and in-group 
solidarity (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006). Thus, we expect customers in societies that emphasize 
embeddedness to be less likely to discount  the  expert’s  advice,  in  order  to  avoid  disrupting  the  
customer-expert relationship, as compared to customers in societies that emphasize autonomy.  
Second, when compared with customers in egalitarian societies, customers in hierarchical 
societies should be more likely to ascribe power to the expert because of her presumed access to 
superior knowledge and information (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006). When customers ascribe 
more power to an expert, they are more likely to invest additional effort to understand and recall 
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the  expert’s  advice (Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2011). We also expect customers in hierarchical 
societies to be less likely to become overconfident and  more  likely  to  “comply  with  the  
obligations  and  rules  attached  to  their  roles  and  status”  (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006, p. 343). 
Hence, we expect the detrimental effects of customer empowerment (especially of expert 
facilitation of informational empowerment and decisional empowerment) on non-adherence to be 
less pronounced in hierarchical cultures. 
Finally, we expect customers in high-mastery societies – such as the U.S. - to be more 
likely to perceive customer empowerment as a legitimate mechanism to enable them to control 
their own destiny and decisions (Markus & Schwartz, 2010). Therefore, we expect the effects of 
customer empowerment on non-adherence to be less detrimental, or more beneficial, in high-
mastery cultures, as compared to the high-harmony cultures.  
4. Data and Method 
4.1. Institutional Context  
Healthcare decisions provide a highly relevant context in which to study customer adherence to 
expert advice (Schwartz, Luce & Ariely, 2011; Stremersch, 2008). In this domain, expert advice 
may be a therapy plan prescribed or recommended by the physician to a consumer, or patient. As 
stated in the introduction, therapy non-adherence generates enormous costs for society and lost 
sales for pharmaceutical firms, triggering significant attention in the marketing literature 
(Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009; Wosinska, 2005).  
Dellande, Gilly and Graham (2004) show that consumer-nurse homophily is an important 
antecedent of therapy adherence in weight-clinics. Kahn and Luce (2003) find that false-positive 
results reduce planned adherence among women in mammography waiting rooms. Bowman, 
Heilman and Seetharaman (2004) find that therapy non-adherence decreases around a doctor 
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visit. Wosinska (2005) shows that direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) modestly decreases 
consumer non-adherence using a 4-year panel of prescription claims. Neslin, Rhoads and 
Wolfson (2009) introduce a method to identify consumers with high risk of non-adherence.  
We also control for other domain-specific drivers of unintentional and reasoned non-
adherence to therapy advice, inspired by prior literature and befitting our theory above. In 
particular, we control for sociodemographics (DiMatteo, 2004), consumer-physician homophily 
(Dellande, Gilly & Graham, 2004), relationship quality (Palmatier et al., 2006), duration, 
frequency of interaction and time since last encounter (Doney & Cannon, 1997), consumer’s  
perceived doctor expertise (given the role of expert power in our theory), consumer health status 
(DiMatteo, 2004), health motivation (Moorman & Matulich, 1993), and consumer medical 
knowledge (World Health Organization, 2003). Figure 2 summarizes our conceptual framework. 
--- Insert Figure 2 About Here --- 
4.2.  Data Collection Method 
We surveyed 11,735 consumers in Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Switzerland, the UK 
and the US. Medical scholars have established the effectiveness of self-reports of consumers on 
therapy adherence (Gehi et al., 2007), which correlates highly with biological measures like 
plasma viraemia (Walsh, Mandalia & Gazzard, 2002). Reverse causality and common method 
variance are two well-known concerns with cross-sectional survey research (Rindfleisch et al., 
2008). Section 6 provides process evidence to establish directionality. Regarding common 
method variance, we  conducted  Harmon’s  one-factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003), and the single 
factor hypothesis was rejected in all countries. We also relied on different response scales and 
anchors  (e.g.  ‘never’  to  ‘very  often’  for  non-adherence,  and  ‘strongly  disagree’  to  ‘strongly  
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agree’  for  informational  empowerment),  which  has  been  shown  to  be  an  effective  strategy  to  
reduce common method bias (Rindfleisch et al., 2008). Our estimated effects also show opposite 
signs (e.g. decisional empowerment versus relationship quality), which is also incompatible with 
similar response behavior across items.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest study of the relationship between 
consumer empowerment and therapy non-adherence to date. We contracted SSI (Survey 
Sampling International) to execute our survey on their online panels. Recruiting and rewarding 
procedures for SSI panels are constantly evaluated in terms of sample representativeness and 
respondent’s  attention  and  motivation. 
We selected this sample of countries, because: (1) it contains sufficient cross-cultural 
variation; (2) consumers are free to choose their physician and typically develop repeated 
interactions with the same physician in each sampled country; (3) survey costs per country were 
not greater than $10,000. We excluded respondents that were younger than 25 or that had less 
than three visits with their current general practitioner, in order to guarantee respondent ability to 
assess the interaction with her physician and therapy non-adherence. 
We constructed the original survey in English, which native speakers translated to 
Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Polish and Portuguese. 
Another native speaker (the back-translator) translated the survey from his native tongue back to 
English. The translators and back-translators were doctoral students in social sciences, fluent in 
English, attending a large European and a large American university. We discussed the translated 
surveys with both translators and back-translators, iteratively, until we were sure that the final 
survey retained exactly the same meaning in all languages. The vast majority of these graduate 
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students were familiar with survey research methods, often through their coursework, which 
allowed us to discuss survey items, and their meanings, in detail.  
4.3. Measurement: Individual-Level Constructs 
In Tables A1-A4 (see Appendix) we provide our measures, their respective sources, their 
reliabilities, and descriptive statistics for each focal construct and for each country. To ensure the 
validity of our measures, we discussed, ex ante, all items in the survey with researchers in 
marketing and two doctoral students in medicine to guarantee that the items were understandable 
and showed content validity. We typically asked the colleague to define the construct in his own 
words before showing her or him our proposed items and then ask for their agreement with the 
proposed operationalization. We pretested our purified measures in Singapore (186 subjects), 
The Netherlands (114 subjects) and the US (102 subjects). The pattern of answers in this pretest 
increased our confidence on the validity of our measures. We discarded these data and rolled-out 
the final survey simultaneously in all countries. 
In the full sample, all scales had a reliability of at least .7, with the two-item measure for 
consumer health motivation as only exception (ρ=.60). We used, five-point, multi-item scales for 
all constructs with the following exceptions. We used a single-item for decisional empowerment, 
because the measurement object (treatment choice) and its associated attribute (who is in charge 
of treatment choice) can both be easily envisioned by respondents (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007). 
This is also consistent with Usta  and  Häubl’s  (2011)  measurement of ‘involvement of self in 
decision’ construct. We also used single items for health status (see Safran et al., 1998), age, 
education, gender, income, socioeconomic status, gender homophily, age homophily, 
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relationship duration, interaction frequency and time since last visit. Unless indicated otherwise 
(see Appendix), we used demeaned scores for these exogenous observed constructs. 
4.4. Measurement: Country-Level National Culture 
We obtained country-specific scores of national culture for all 17 countries from Shalom 
Schwartz, which are based on equally weighting scores of college students of varied majors and 
of schoolteachers of varied topics. These scores are similar to Schwartz (1994), but differ 
somewhat from these original teacher and student scores, because of the addition of new samples 
and updated measures (see Schwartz, 2009 for more details).  
Schwartz’s  (1994)  cultural values theory  relies  on  the  concept  of  “societal  means”  for  
different cultural values, which are obtained by aggregating individual value priorities. These 
“societal  means”  capture  the  latent  cultural  orientations  to  which  all  individuals  are  exposed  and,  
especially in social contexts (like customer-expert interactions), to which they tend to adapt 
(Fischer  &  Schwartz,  2011).  Yet,  Schwartz’s  conceptualization  of  culture as external to the 
individual  allows  for  substantial  variation  of  individual  values  around  these  “societal  means” and 
avoids the assumption of high within-society value consensus (Schwartz, 2011). 
These cultural dimensions are therefore appropriate for cross-country comparisons but 
not for characterizing the values of individuals, which fits our research purposes. In cross-
cultural analyses, it is important to avoid the problem of ecological fallacy. Ecological fallacy 
occurs when researchers assume that nation-level variables directly apply to individuals (Bond, 
2002). In our case, the usage of national-level cultural dimensions is appropriate because we are 
interested in the role of culture as a moderator of the country-level effects of customer 
empowerment on non-adherence. 
22 
 
4.5. Model Specification 
In our models, i indexes respondents (i=1,…,N; N=11,735), c indexes countries (c=1,...,C; 
C=17), p indexes response items measuring latent constructs (p=1,…,P; P=28), q indexes latent 
endogenous constructs (q=1,..,Q; Q=2), and r indexes latent exogenous constructs (r=1,…,R; 
R=6). We specify our measurement equations relating the latent endogenous constructs - 
unintentional non-adherence (UNA) and reasoned non-adherence (RNA) – to the observed 
responses as follows:  
c
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c
p
c
ip
c
ip UNAy HOW  ,  for  1  ≤  p ≤  4. (1)  
c
ipi
c
p
c
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ip RNAy HOW  ,  for  5  ≤  p ≤  9. (2)  
And for the latent exogenous constructs as follows: 
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c
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ipy H[OW  , for p > 9. (3)  
Where ir[  denotes an exogenous latent variable (i.e. expert facilitation of informational 
empowerment (EFIE), consumer-initiated informational empowerment (CIIE), relationship 
quality, consumer medical knowledge, health motivation and perceived doctor expertise). cipW  are 
individual-specific random intercepts that account for systematic differences in scale usage 
across individuals and countries. We extend a model by Maydeu-Olivares and Coffman (2006), 
and partition the individual-specific random intercepts into a fixed component cpP , common to 
all respondents in country c but specific for item p, and a scale usage heterogeneity component, 
c
i9 , which varies from respondent to respondent but is common to all items:  
c
i
c
p
c
ip 9PW  , for all p. (4)  
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The mean and variance of the scale usage heterogeneity component in Equation 4 ( ci9 ) are 
country-specific (
c9 and 2,9V c , c=1,…,17).  Note that cipW , in Equation 4, captures each 
respondent’s  baseline  tendency  to  score  high  (or  low)  in  each  of  the  constructs  we  measure.  For  
instance, baseline tendencies for non-adherence are captured by cipW , where 1  ≤  p ≤  9.  For model 
identification, we assume that the ci9 ’s  are  uncorrelated  with  the  error  terms and with the latent 
factors, which implies that differences in the usage of response scales are not related to 
respondents’  scores  in  the  constructs  being  measured  (see  Maydeu-Olivares & Coffman, 2006).  
  We collect the error terms in Equations 1-3 in a single (Pu1) random vector of residuals, 
c
iε , which we assume to be normally distributed as N(0,<c), where <c is a (PuP) diagonal 
covariance matrix. The error terms are orthogonal to the latent factors.  
Our structural model is defined as:  
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Where the βc parameters5 are country-specific parameters capturing the effects of customer 
empowerment on unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. c*,iξ  is a vector where we collect all 
exogenous latent variables besides the customer empowerment constructs (i.e. relationship 
quality, consumer medical knowledge, health motivation and perceived doctor expertise), Xi is a 
                                                 
5 That is, ^ `c RNADEc RNACIIEc RNAEFIEc UNADEc UNACIIEc UNAEFIE !!!!!! EEEEEE ,,,,, , for all c. 
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vector where we collect all remaining control variables (i.e. all observed independent variables). 
Consequently, qΓ , for q=1,2, contain the structural paths corresponding to the control variables, 
pooled across countries. We collect all exogenous latent variables in a (Ru1) vector 
]'[ 'c*,i
c
i ξξ iii DECIIEEFIE  distributed according to N(0,Φc), where Φc is a (RuR) full 
covariance matrix6 and we assume the residuals, cq,iδ , are independent of the latent variables and 
distributed N(0, c q,G\ ), for q=1,2.  
4.6. Estimation  
We use Bayesian estimation, which is a more flexible approach to the estimation of theory-
driven structural equation models than maximum likelihood (Muthén & Asparouhov, 2012). We 
specify the posterior distribution of the parameters of interest across all respondents and estimate 
the model simultaneously across all countries. We sample the model parameters from their 
posterior distributions using the Gibbs sampler (Casella & George, 1992) with data 
augmentation, which allows sampling the latent constructs alongside the model parameters 
(Tanner & Wong, 1987).  
Bayesian estimation also facilitates our task of assessing the moderating effects of culture 
in our model. In particular, at each iteration of our Gibbs sampler, we store the correlations 
between each of the country-specific paths in our structural model (i.e. the βc parameters) and 
Schwartz’s (1994) culture dimensions. We use standard diffuse priors for our parameters (normal 
distributions for measurement intercepts, loadings and structural parameters and inverse-Wishart 
distributions for variance–covariance matrices).  
                                                 
6 A full covariance matrix allows us to control for covariation among exogenous latent constructs (Lee, 2007). 
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4.7. Identification and measurement invariance  
In addition to the standard distributional assumptions, discussed above, for the residuals, for the 
random intercepts ( cipτ , in line with Maydeu-Olivares & Coffman, 2006) and for ciξ (which 
identify the item intercepts), we follow the normal practice of setting the factor loading of one 
item per construct (the marker item) to unity (which identifies the scale of the latent constructs). 
In addition, for meaningful cross-national comparisons, we need a sufficient degree of metric 
invariance across countries. Following Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), we test the 
hypothesis of full metric invariance by constraining the matrix of factor loadings to be invariant 
across countries. The configural model has a smaller DIC (DICconfig = 611,998) than the metric 
invariance model (DICminv = 613,385), which means that we do not find support for full metric 
invariance (DIC: deviance information criterion; see Spiegelhalter et al., 2002).  
Full metric invariance is very unlikely (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, p.81) and 
Byrne, Shavelson & Muthén (1989) have established that partial metric invariance is sufficient 
for cross-cultural equivalence and meaningful cross-national comparison. In order to understand 
the lack of full metric invariance, we compared the factor loadings from the measurement 
invariance model with those of the configural model. We first stored, at each draw, the 20 factor 
loadings across the 17 countries in our sample obtained from the configural model. Next, we 
computed the 95% credible intervals for each of these 340 loadings across the posterior draws 
from our MCMC chain. We then examined whether the 95% credible interval for each of the 
country-specific loadings from the configural model contained the posterior median of the 
corresponding factor loading estimated using the metric invariance model. This was the case in 
243 out of the 340 loadings (i.e. 71.5% of the loadings; see Table A3 in the Appendix for a 
cross-country comparison). More importantly, when comparing the structural path estimates 
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between the metric invariance and the configural models we saw no meaningful differences. The 
correlation between the focal structural paths (capturing the effects of customer empowerment on 
non-adherence) in the configural and metric invariance models is .99 and we do not find any 
significant difference across paths. In other words, in all cases, the 95% credible intervals of the 
structural paths in the metric invariance model contained the posterior mean of the same path 
according to the configural model and vice versa. Overall, these results provide strong evidence 
that we have sufficient cross-country equivalence to make cross-national inferences. 
5. Results 
5.1. Non-Adherence to Expert Advice across Countries 
Figure 3 plots the mean levels of unintentional and reasoned non-adherence across countries in 
our sample, computed by averaging, across the MCMC draws, the measurement intercepts ( cipW ). 
We do not restrict the measurement intercepts across countries, since the latent means are 
constrained to be equal, which ensures meaningful cross-national comparison. The dashed lines 
in Figure 3 represent the median levels. While there is a positive relationship between 
unintentional and reasoned non-adherence, the relationship is not perfect (ρ=.80 and a linear 
regression of RNA on UNA has an R2 of .64). Consumers in Estonia, Japan, India and Singapore 
exhibit considerably higher levels of non-adherence than consumers in Denmark and the 
Netherlands.  
--- Introduce Figure 3 about here --- 
5.2. Customer Empowerment and Non-Adherence to Expert Advice 
Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients from our multi-sample structural equation model with 
country-specific random effects in the measurement model capturing scale usage heterogeneity. 
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We let all chains converge by running our models for 25,000 iterations, discarding the first 
10,000 for burn-in, and using the subsequent 1,500 thinned draws (we used every 10th draw to 
reduce autocorrelation) for posterior inference. The estimates are the posterior cross-country 
medians obtained from the MCMC chains from our Gibbs-sampler7. Bolded figures represent 
estimates for which the 95% credible interval (the interval between the 2.5th and the 97.5th 
percentiles of the distribution of MCMC draws) does not contain zero.  
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
Even though we find a positive relationship between expert facilitation of informational 
empowerment (EFIE) and non-adherence, the relationship was neither significant8 for 
unintentional non-adherence ( UNAEFIE !E = .04; 95% CI = [-.01; .09]) nor for reasoned non-
adherence ( RNAEFIE !E  = .04; 95% CI = [-.02; .09]). These initial results do not support H1 and H2.  
In support of H3, customer-initiated informational empowerment (CIIE) is associated 
with lower levels of unintentional non-adherence ( UNACIIE!E = -.22; 95% CI = [-.28; -.17]). CIIE 
is also associated with lower reasoned non-adherence ( RNACIIE!E = -.16; 95% CI = [-.21; -.11]), 
which suggests that the motivational benefits of discussing, during an advising interaction, 
solution-relevant information that customers finds self-relevant are stronger than the detrimental 
effects of such discussion on customer overconfidence.  
                                                 
7 We obtain these posterior cross-country medians by averaging, at each draw, the beta parameters -
^ `c RNADEc RNACIIEc RNAEFIEc UNADEc UNACIIEc UNAEFIE !!!!!! EEEEEE ,,,,, , for all c - across countries and then obtaining the 
posterior median of these averages. 
8 We  use  the  term  “significant”  whenever  the  95%  credible  interval  of  a  certain  parameter  does  not  contain  zero. 
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In support of hypotheses H4 and H5, decisional empowerment (DE) is associated with 
higher unintentional non-adherence ( UNADE!E = .04; 95% CI = [.03; .06]) and with higher 
reasoned non-adherence ( RNADE!E = .08; 95% CI = [.06; .10]).  
5.3. Other Drivers of Non-Adherence to Expert Advice 
Table 2 presents the estimates for the control variables. Our results are in line with the findings 
of prior literature. We discuss several interesting paths, while a more detailed note on all effects 
is available from the first author upon request. The results on sociodemographics are consistent 
with the medical literature (DiMatteo, 2004) and recent research in marketing (Neslin, Rhoads & 
Wolfson 2009), which find no or modest effects of sociodemographics on non-adherence.  
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
The beneficial effects of relationship quality on therapy non-adherence are consistent 
with the relationship marketing literature (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 1998; Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). Gender homophily is associated with lower levels of unintentional non-adherence, 
but not reasoned non-adherence. The latter effect is consistent with prior research in marketing 
(Dellande, Gilly & Graham, 2004). Reasoned non-adherence decreases with interaction 
frequency, which is not true for unintentional non-adherence. Reasoned non-adherence also 
tends to increase between visits, in line with Bowman, Heilman & Seetharaman (2004). We do 
not find such an effect for unintentional non-adherence.  
6. Process Evidence 
We now discuss process evidence on the effects of customer empowerment on unintentional and 
reasoned non-adherence. We use customer-centered communication quality (i.e., the extent to 
which the customer believes that her doctor spends sufficient time, during an advising 
interaction, sharing clear and understandable information with her, see Kao et al., 1998) and 
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locus of control (the customer’s  confidence in her own ability to cure herself, see Moorman and 
Matulich, 1993) as mediators (see Table 3). We first discuss the influence of these mediators on 
non-adherence, after which we turn to the influence of empowerment on these mediators. 
In line with our expectations, high customer-centered communication quality is 
associated with lower levels of unintentional non-adherence ( .med UNACQUAL!J  = -.26; 95% CI = [-.31; -
.22]) and reasoned non-adherence ( .med RNACQUAL!J = -.29; 95% CI = [-.34; -.25]). Also as theorized, 
high locus of control – i.e. our proxy for customer overconfidence - is associated with higher 
levels of unintentional ( .med UNALOCUS!J = .03; 95% CI = [.02; .05]) and reasoned non-adherence (
.med
RNALOCUS!J = .09; 95% CI = [.07; .11]). 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
Expert facilitation of informational empowerment (EFIE) is associated with higher 
customer-centered communication quality ( .med CQUALEFIE !E = .67; 95% CI = [.64; .70]), but this effect 
is offset by a direct effect on unintentional non-adherence ( .med UNAEFIE!E = .25; 95% CI = [.18; .31]). 
This is consistent with the logic under H1. That is, unrequested solution-relevant information 
makes the advice harder to recall and may crowd out other pieces of information that may be 
more relevant to stimulate adherence (Epstein, Korones, & Quill, 2010), offsetting the beneficial 
impact of EFIE on customer-centered communication quality. EFIE is negatively, but 
insignificantly, associated to locus of control ( .med LOCUSEFIE !E = -.05; 95% CI = [-.12; .02]) and 
positively associated with reasoned non-adherence ( .med RNAEFIE !E = .25; 95% CI = [.20; .31]). This 
suggests  that  EFIE  increases  customers’  tendency  to  egocentrically  discount  the  expert’s  advice,  
in line with the behavioral mechanism underlying H2. 
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 Customer-initiated informational empowerment (CIIE) is associated with worse 
customer-centered communication quality ( .med CQUALCIIE!E = -.06; 95% CI = [-.10; -.03]) but also with 
lower unintentional non-adherence ( .med UNACIIE!E = -.23; 95% CI = [-.29; -.18]). These two effects are 
consistent with the relations we theorized in H3. That is, even though when compared to a 
paternalistic model, CIIE may decrease communication quality – for instance, because it 
increases time pressure during an advising interaction (Dugdale, Epstein, & Pantilat, 1999) – it 
increases customer motivation, facilitating understanding and future recall of the expert advice. 
CIIE is associated with higher locus of control ( .med LOCUSCIIE!E = .24; 95% CI = [.15; .31]) and with 
lower reasoned non-adherence ( .med RNACIIE!E = -.16; 95% CI = [-.22; -.11]). These results suggest that 
while CIIE may also trigger overconfidence to a certain extent, the fact that it affords an 
opportunity for experts to explain and clarify their advice leads to lower reasoned non-adherence.  
Similarly, decisional empowerment (DE) is associated with worse customer-centered 
communication quality ( .medCQUALDE!E = -.03; 95% CI = [-.04; -.02]), with higher locus of control (
.med
LOCUSDE!E = .11; 95% CI = [.04; .16]), and both with higher unintentional non-adherence (
.med
UNADE!E = .04; 95% CI = [.02; .05]) and reasoned non-adherence ( .med RNADE!E = .07; 95% CI = [.05; 
.08]). These effects are also consistent with the relations we theorized in H4 and H5. In sum, the 
empirical relations we uncover through our mediation analyses are logically consistent with our 
theoretical expectations.  
7. National-Cultural Effects 
We now analyze cross-country differences in the relationship between customer empowerment 
and adherence to expert advice. The posterior cross-country standard deviations, in the last 
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column of Table 1, are all relatively high when compared with the corresponding posterior 
medians (σEFIE>UNA=.13; σEFIE>RNA=.13; σCIIE>UNA=.15; σCIIE>RNA=.17; σDE>UNA=.05; σDE>RNA=.05). 
Table 4 presents the posterior correlations between the country-specific posterior estimates for 
the paths between customer empowerment and non-adherence  and  Schwartz’s  country-specific 
cultural dimensions. This analysis revealed that the effects of decisional empowerment and, to a 
lesser extent, of customer-initiated informational empowerment and expert facilitation of 
informational empowerment on non-adherence are moderated by culture. Culture is a stronger 
moderator of RNA (ten posterior correlations with 95% credible intervals not containing zero) 
than of UNA (two posterior correlations with 95% credible intervals not containing zero). We 
first discuss the moderating effects of culture on the relationship between decisional 
empowerment and non-adherence. 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
In high-embeddedness cultures (ρ[DE>RNA],EMBEDDEDNESS = -.31, 95% CI = [-.57;-.00]), 
high-hierarchy cultures (ρ[DE>RNA],HIERARCHY = -.34, 95% CI = [-.60;-.01]), and high-mastery 
cultures (ρ[DE>RNA],MASTERY =- .40, 95% CI = [-.67;-.06]), decisional empowerment is less 
detrimental as it increases reasoned non-adherence less than in other cultures. In high-intellectual 
autonomy cultures (ρ[DE>RNA],INTELL.AUTONOMY = .44, 95% CI = [.15;.69]) and harmonious cultures 
(ρ[DE>RNA],HARMONY = .57, 95% CI = [.32;.77]), decisional empowerment increases reasoned non-
adherence more than in other cultures. We also find that in harmonious cultures, decisional 
empowerment increases unintentional non-adherence more than in other cultures 
(ρ[DE>UNA],HARMONY = .36, 95% CI = [.05;.62]). These effects are in line with our theory-driven 
expectations. For instance, when compared with customers in high-mastery societies, customers 
in harmonious societies should perceive decisional empowerment as more incongruent with the 
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expected roles of customers and experts. Higher perceived incongruence, in turn, should magnify 
the detrimental effects of decisional empowerment on unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. 
The effect of expert facilitation of informational empowerment (EFIE) on reasoned non-
adherence is less detrimental in high-hierarchy countries (ρ[EFIE>RNA],HIERARCHY= -.56, 95% CI = [-
.79;-.16]) but more detrimental in high-egalitarianism cultures (ρ[EFIE>RNA], EGALITARIANISM= .40, 
95% CI = [.02;.65]). The effect of EFIE on unintentional non-adherence is also less detrimental 
in high-hierarchy countries (ρ[EFIE>UNA],HIERARCHY= -.45, 95% CI = [-.71;-.08]), as compared to 
customers in less hierarchical countries. In high-hierarchy cultures, customers are less likely to 
engage  in  behaviors  that  threaten  the  expert’s  role  and,  thus,  EFIE  has  less  detrimental  effects  
than in other countries (e.g. high-egalitarianism). 
Finally, the beneficial effect of customer-initiated informational empowerment (CIIE) on 
reasoned non-adherence is weaker in high-affective autonomy and high-intellectual autonomy 
cultures than in other cultures (ρ[CIIE>RNA],AFF.AUTONOMY = .40, 95% CI = [.13;.64]; 
ρ[CIIE>RNA],INT.AUTONOMY = .35, 95% CI = [.03;.59]) but stronger in high-embeddedness cultures 
(ρ[CIIE>RNA], EMBEDDEDNESS = -.43, 95% CI = [-.66;-.11]) . Compared with customers in high-
embeddedness cultures, customers in more autonomous cultures may have a tendency to be vocal 
(high CIIE) but also to  follow  their  own  opinion  even  if  that  entails  discounting  an  expert’s  
opinion (high RNA).  
8. Conclusion 
We study the effect of customer empowerment on the adherence to expert advice in the context 
of medical treatment decisions. We organize different customer-expert decision-making styles 
according to the distinction between expert facilitation of informational empowerment, 
customer-initiated informational empowerment and decisional empowerment. In line with the 
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beneficial effects attributed to customer empowerment in the prior literature, we find that 
customer-initiated informational empowerment reduces both unintentional and reasoned non-
adherence. However, contrary to these beneficial attributions, we uncover that decisional 
empowerment increases unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. In addition, expert 
facilitation of informational empowerment improves the quality of customer-centered 
communication but may increase the cognitive and emotional burden for the customer and crowd 
out important pieces of information. These detrimental effects offset the benefits of expert 
facilitation of informational empowerment on customer-centered communication quality. 
We find that culture moderates several of these relationships. For instance, in countries 
where decisional empowerment is congruent with national culture, its detrimental effects can be 
somewhat reduced. For example, in high-mastery cultures, such as the U.S., decisional 
empowerment triggers less customer overconfidence and thus less reasoned non-adherence. 
Exploring such cross-cultural heterogeneity allowed us to better understand in which cultures 
empowerment may have the largest or smallest impact on non-adherence.  
8.1. Implications 
These findings provide important and counterintuitive insights. The current thinking among 
many scholars is that shared informed autonomy (high decisional and informational 
empowerment) is the customer-expert decision-making model that minimizes non-adherence to 
expert advice (Epstein, Alper & Quill, 2004; Macfarlane, 2008). Financial and tax advisors, 
lawyers, doctors and management consultants – to name just a few – routinely consider whether 
accommodating the whims and opinions of their customers (versus maintaining a strong opinion 
and decision control) would help them achieve better results (Usta & Häubl, 2011), in particular 
higher customer adherence to their advice (Epstein, Alper & Quill 2004; Quill & Brody, 1996). 
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In contrast with this view, we find that customer-driven informed delegation is the model 
that minimizes non-adherence to expert advice. The underpinnings of this model are that: (1) 
decision power should remain with the expert if the expert wishes the customer to adhere to her 
advice, (2) customers should be allowed to ask questions and offer their opinion, and (3) experts 
should not proactively facilitate informational empowerment.  
In the specific case of patient-doctor interactions – the institutional context of our 
empirical analysis – these findings are particularly timely. From the famous paternalistic scenes 
in  the  movie  “Patch  Adams,” the medical decision-making model is now undergoing increasing 
pressure to be more consumer-centric. In light of our findings, the concern that consumer-
centricity may in practice turn to healthcare consumerism and reduce healthcare quality 
(Camacho, 2014; Starkey, 2003), seems valid for treatment non-adherence. In the optimal model 
– customer-driven informed delegation – the physician acts as an agent to whom customers 
delegate authority (a feature also present in the paternalistic model) and is responsive, but not 
proactive, to exchange solution-relevant information (a feature that is not present in the 
paternalistic model).  
Cross-national heterogeneity in the magnitude of our effects allows us to offer some 
culturally-specific implications. In particular, sharing more decision power with customers 
would be less detrimental for experts in the US (a culture that emphasizes mastery and self-
assertion) than for experts in many Western European countries such as Denmark, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands (cultures that emphasize harmony and intellectual autonomy). 
8.2. Future Research 
Our study has several limitations that can open new avenues for future research. First, future 
research using revealed customer adherence data, for instance, from script refills, holds great 
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promise, because it shows greater external validity. On the other hand, such data may contain 
less detail (e.g. no distinction between reasoned and unintentional non-adherence), possibly 
contain self-selection mechanisms (e.g. most patient-monitoring programs are opt-in) and be 
hard to obtain.  
Second, in this paper, we study customer non-adherence as a behavioral trait (in line for 
instance with DiMatteo et al., 1993 and Bowman, Heilman & Seetharaman, 2004). Despite this 
tradition, it would be interesting if future research would look into context-specific motivations 
for adherence. Most studies have also focused on patient adherence to physician advice. It would 
be interesting if future work in marketing explored customer non-adherence in contexts beyond 
healthcare, such as consulting, financial or tax advice, legal advice, etc. 
Third, in our cultural analyses, we rely on country-level cultural scores and test whether 
these scores predict variation in country-specific effects of customer empowerment on adherence 
to expert advice. Future research could rely on individual-level value scores to explore within-
country value heterogeneity and test the sensitivity of our results to the unit of analysis chosen 
for cultural inferences.  
Fourth, future research could also explore behavioral interventions aimed at reducing 
unintentional and/or reasoned non-adherence to treatment advice. For instance, Adhere.IO is a 
behavioral diagnostic invented at MIT that uses lateral flow technology – the technology used in 
pregnancy tests – to verify, remotely, if a patient took her drugs on time and reward those who 
accurately follow the therapy advice (Gomez-Marquez, 2013). Future studies could help 
optimize this type of behavioral interventions to maximize reduction of unintentional and/or 
reasoned non-adherence. 
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Fifth, in this study we assumed that the customer seeks the advice of a single expert. 
Research on advice-taking, however, suggests that integrating the advice of multiple experts may 
improve  customers’  decisions  (Bonaccio  &  Dalal,  2006;;  Budescu  et  al.,  2003). Future research 
could thus examine how customers integrate and weigh the advice from multiple experts 
possibly with distinct decision-making styles. 
Sixth, there are also many situations where adherence to expert advice is not an 
individual, but a group decision. For instance, when lawyers or management consultants advise 
an executive committee on a litigation or business strategy, adherence to the expert’s  advice is 
determined through negotiation among the members of the executive committee. Future research 
may explore advice-giving to multiple agents in the same decision-making unit and the 
optimality of different customer-expert decision-making models in such contexts. 
Seventh, existing research on dual-process models has identified several antecedents of 
people’s  tendency  to  engage  in  heuristic or systematic information processing (e.g. Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Future research could further explore customer, expert and customer-
expert interaction characteristics that may trigger the activation of these different types of 
information processing modes and influence customer adherence to expert advice. 
In general, the present paper may inform policy discussions on patient empowerment. It 
may also guide experts on how to engage with their customers, to the extent they want their 
customers to adhere to their advice. Finally, it also may be informative for customers, because 
they may themselves suffer from not adhering to expert advice.   
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FIGURE 1: A NEW ORGANIZATION OF CUSTOMER-EXPERT DECISION-MAKING 
MODELS 
 
 
 
 
 
Customer-initiated 
informational empowerment (CIIE) 
(y-axis) 
 
Expert facilitation of 
informational empowerment  
(EFIE) 
(x-axis) 
High Decisional 
Empowerment 
(z-axis) 
(Customer has more power in 
final choice) 
Low Decisional 
Empowerment 
(Expert has more power in final 
choice) 
Paternalistic 
Customer-driven 
informed autonomy 
 
Customer-driven 
informed delegation 
Consumerism 
 
Expert-driven 
informed delegation 
Expert-driven 
informed autonomy 
44 
 
FIGURE 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We indicate our hypotheses and expected signs next to the corresponding arrows followed by an indication, in parentheses, of whether or not the 
corresponding parameter, represents a non-significant (NS; 95% credible interval of this effect contains zero), or a significant (S; 95% credible interval of this 
effect does not contain zero) path. We left the path between customer-initiated informational empowerment and reasoned non-adherence as an open empirical 
question, so we indicate only our empirical finding. Solid thick arrows indicate hypotheses grounded on dual models of information processing (Chaiken, 1980; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Dotted thick arrows indicate hypotheses grounded on overconfidence (See et al., 2011; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012).
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FIGURE 3: UNINTENTIONAL VS REASONED NON-ADHERENCE ACROSS COUNTRIES 
 
 
Note: The country-specific levels of unintentional and reasoned non-adherence were computed by averaging, across the MCMC draws, the estimated 
measurement intercepts ( cipW ) of the items measuring each of the constructs. All items were measured in a 5-point Likert scale. The dashed-lines indicate the 
median levels of unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. The solid line and corresponding equation represent a linear trend model. The R2 of this model is 
.64, which indicates a high but not perfect correlation between unintentional and reasoned non-adherence  (ρ=.80). 
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TABLE 1: EFFECTS OF CUSTOMER EMPOWERMENT ON UNINTENTIONAL AND REASONED NON-ADHERENCE 
 
 
 
  
Posterior 
Cross-Country 
Median 
95%  
Credible 
Interval 
Posterior 
Cross-Country 
Std. Deviation 
EFIE  →  UNA  .04 [-.01,.09] .13 
EFIE  →  RNA  .04 [-.02,.09] .13 
CIIE  →  UNA  -.22 [-.28,-.17] .15 
CIIE  →  RNA  -.16 [-.21,-.11] .17 
DE  →  UNA  .04 [.03,.06] .05 
DE  →  RNA   .08 [.06,.10] .05 
Acronyms: EFIE = Expert Facilitation of Informational Empowerment; CIIE = Customer-Initiated Informational Empowerment; DE = Decisional 
Empowerment; UNA = Unintentional Non-Adherence; RNA = Reasoned Non-Adherence.  
Notes: We estimate a random intercept factor analysis model (Maydeu-Olivares & Coffman, 2006) capturing systematic differences in usage of response scales. 
At each draw in our MCMC chain, we computed the averages and the standard deviations of the posterior means of the depicted structural paths across all 
countries in our sample. We stored these cross-country averages (MUs) and standard deviations (SDs). The posterior cross-country medians are the medians of 
these averages (MUs) across the 1,500 draws we used for inference (total number of draws = 25,000; burn-in = 10,000; thinning = 10). The 95% Credible 
Intervals depict the 2.5th and the 97.5th percentiles of the distribution of these averages (MUs). We bolded the paths whose 95% credible interval do not contain 
zero. The posterior cross-country standard deviations are the medians of the stored standard deviations (SDs). All endogenous and exogenous latent and 
observed constructs in our structural model have mean zero.  
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TABLE 2: CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Sociodemographics 
  Posterior Median 
95%  
Credible 
Interval 
Age→  UNA  -.13 [-.15,-.11] 
Age→  RNA  -.10 [-.12,-.09] 
Education→  UNA  -.01 [-.02,.01] 
Education→  RNA  -.01 [-.03,.00] 
Gender  (male  =1)→  UNA  .04 [-.01,.09] 
Gender  (male  =1)→  RNA  .02 [-.03,.07] 
Income→  UNA  -.00 [-.01,.01] 
Income→  RNA  -.01 [-.01,.00] 
Socioeconomic  status→  UNA  -.01 [-.02,.01] 
Socioeconomic  status→  RNA  -.01 [-.03,.01] 
Consumer-Expert Relationship      
Relationship  quality→  UNA  -.60 [-.71,-.49] 
Relationship  quality→  RNA  -.72 [-.83,-.61] 
Gender  homophily→  UNA  -.06 [-.11,-.00] 
Gender  homophily→  RNA  -.03 [-.08,.02] 
Age  homophily→  UNA  -.01 [-.02,.01] 
Age  homophily→  RNA  -.00 [-.02,.01] 
Relationship  duration→  UNA  -.03 [-.05,-.02] 
Relationship  duration→  RNA  -.02 [-.04,-.01] 
Interaction  frequency→  UNA  -.01 [-.02,.01] 
Interaction  frequency→  RNA  -.04 [-.05,-.02] 
Time  since  last  visit→  UNA  .00 [-.01,.02] 
Time since last visit→  RNA  .02 [.00,.03] 
Health Drivers       
Consumer  medical  knowledge→  UNA  -.21 [-.24,-.18] 
Consumer  medical  knowledge→  RNA  -.17 [-.20,-.14] 
Health  status→  UNA  -.07 [-.09,-.05] 
Health  status→  RNA  -.02 [-.04,.00] 
Health  motivation→  UNA  -.39 [-.43,-.34] 
Health  motivation→  RNA  -.27 [-.31,-.23] 
Doctor  expertise→  UNA  -.17 [-.25,-.08] 
Doctor  expertise→  RNA  -.26 [-.35,-.18] 
 
Acronyms: EFIE = Expert Facilitation of Informational Empowerment; CIIE = Customer-Initiated Informational 
Empowerment; DE = Decisional Empowerment; UNA = Unintentional Non-Adherence; RNA = Reasoned Non-
Adherence.  
 
Note: For model stability and identification, the structural paths for control variables were estimated pooled across 
countries.  
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TABLE 3: RANDOM INTERCEPTS MEDIATION MODEL  
 
 
 
Effects of the Mediators on Non-Adherence 
Posterior 
Cross-
Country 
Median 
 
95%  
Credible 
Interval 
 
Posterior 
Cross-
Country Std. 
Deviation 
 
Communication Quality →  UNA -.26 [-.31,-.22] .15 
Communication Quality →  RNA -.29 [-.34,-.25] .19 
Health  Locus  of  Control  →  UNA .03 [.02,.05] .06 
Health  Locus  of  Control  →  RNA .09 [.07,.11] .06 
 
Effects of Empowerment on the Mediators    
EFIE  →  Communication Quality .67 [.64,.70] .15 
EFIE  →  Health  Locus  of  Control -.05 [-.12,.02] .22 
CIIE  →  Communication Quality -.06 [-.10,-.03] .19 
CIIE  →  Health  Locus  of  Control .24 [.15,.31] .28 
DE  →  Communication Quality -.03 [-.04,-.02] .03 
DE  →  Health  Locus  of  Control .11 [.04,.16] .14 
    
Direct Effects    
EFIE  →  UNA .25 [.18,.31] .16 
EFIE  →  RNA .25 [.20,.31] .15 
CIIE  →  UNA -.23 [-.29,-.18] .16 
CIIE  →  RNA -.16 [-.22,-.11] .17 
DE  →  UNA .04 [.02,.05] .05 
DE  →  RNA .07 [.05,.08] .06 
Acronyms: EFIE = Expert Facilitation of Informational Empowerment; CIIE = Customer-Initiated Informational 
Empowerment; DE = Decisional Empowerment; UNA = Unintentional Non-Adherence; RNA = Reasoned Non-
Adherence. 
Note: The model includes the same set of control variables used in our main model. The full set of parameter 
estimates is available upon request. 
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TABLE 4 – POSTERIOR  CORRELATIONS:  SCHWARTZ’S  CULTURAL  DIMENSIONS  AND  THE  RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN CUSTOMER EMPOWERMENT AND NON-ADHERENCE 
 
 
  
Affective 
Autonomy 
Intellectual 
Autonomy Embeddedness Egalitarianism Hierarchy Harmony Mastery 
EFIE →  UNA .01 [-.31;.31] .14 [-.21;.45] -.14 [-.45;.22] .18 [-.20;.48] -.45 [-.71;-.08] .25 [-.06;.53] -.30 [-.61;.09] 
EFIE  →  RNA .19 [-.15;.46] .33 [-.04;.63] -.34 [-.62;.03] .40 [.02;.65] -.56 [-.79;-.16] .24 [-.09;. 52] -.22 [-.55;.21] 
CIIE  →  UNA .32 [-.01;. 60] .35 [-.03;.65] -.34 [-.65;.03] .08 [-.28;.41] -.03 [-.39;.37] .11 [-.21;.44] -.14 [-.50;.28] 
CIIE  →  RNA .40 [.13;.64] .35 [.03;.59] -.43 [-.66;-.11] .22 [-.09;.50] -.17 [-.45;.18] .15 [-.12;.40] -.24 [-.54;.11] 
DE  →  UNA .16 [-.18;.49] .30 [-.04;.59] -.25 [-.55;.09] .07 [-.28;.43] .00 [-.36;.34] .36 [.05;.62] -.01 [-.40;.37] 
DE  →  RNA .09 [-.21;.38] .44 [.15;.69] -.31 [-.57;-.00] .28 [-.04;.55] -.34 [-.60;-.01] .57 [.32;.77] -.40 [-.67;-.06] 
Acronyms: EFIE = Expert Facilitation of Informational Empowerment; CIIE = Customer-Initiated Informational Empowerment; DE = Decisional 
Empowerment; UNA = Unintentional Non-Adherence; RNA = Reasoned Non-Adherence. 
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APPENDIX: MEASURES AND METRIC INVARIANCE 
TABLE A1: CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES 
Constructs and Measures [Source] 
Unintentional Non-Adherence  (α  =  .84)  [DiMatteo et al. (1993)]: Please tell us how often you can imagine 
yourself  … 
1. …forgetting  to  take  your  medicines? 
2. …having  a  hard  time  doing  what  your  doctor  suggested you to do? 
3. …being  unable  to  do  what  was  necessary  to  follow  your  doctor’s  treatment  plans? 
4. …missing  taking  your  medications  because  you  were  away  from  home  or  busy  with  other  things? 
Reasoned Non-Adherence  (α  =  .87)  [DiMatteo et al. (1993)]: Please tell us how often you can imagine yourself 
missing  taking  your  medications  because… 
1. …  you  seemed  to  need  less  medicine? 
2. …  you  didn’t  believe  in  the  treatment  your  doctor  was  recommending  you? 
3. …  you wanted to avoid side effects or felt like the drug was toxic or harmful? 
4. …  you  wanted  to  try  alternative  therapies  (e.g.  herbalist,  homeopathic  or  acupuncture  treatments…)? 
5. …the  medication  was  too  expensive? 
Response scale for non-adherence: 1 = "never," 2 = "rarely," 3 = "sometimes," 4 = "often," 5 = "very often" 
Expert  Facilitation  of  Informational  Empowerment  (α  =  .83)  [Kao et al. (1998); Lerman et al. (1990)]: Please 
read each of the statements below and indicate to what extent it describes your own experience with your doctor.  
1. My doctor asks me about how my family or living situation might affect my health. 
2. My doctor shares with me the risks and benefits associated with alternative treatment options. 
3. My doctor asks me what I believe is causing my medical symptoms. 
4. My doctor encourages me to give my opinion about medical treatments. 
Customer-Initiated  Informational  Empowerment  (α  =  .74)  [Lerman et al. (1990)]: Please read each of the 
statements below and indicate to what extent it describes your own experience with your doctor.  
1. I ask my doctor to explain to me the treatments or procedures in detail. 
2. I ask my doctor a lot of questions about my medical symptoms. 
3. I give my opinion (agreement or disagreement) about the types of test or treatment that my doctor orders. 
Response scale for informational empowerment: 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 3 = "neutral," 4 = "agree," 
5 = "strongly agree" 
Decisional Empowerment [Similar to Usta and Häubl (2011)]: Who possesses more power in treatment decisions, 
that is, who has more influence in determining the treatment(s) you follow? 
Response scale: 1 = "my doctor has more power," 2 = "my doctor has slightly more power," 3 = "my doctor and I 
have about the same power," 4 = "I have slightly more power," 5 = "I have more power".  
Communication  Quality  (α  =  .89)  [Kao et al. (1998)]: Please read each of the statements below and indicate to 
what extent it describes your own experience with your doctor.  
1. When I ask questions to my doctor, I get answers that are understandable. 
2. My doctor gives me enough time to explain the reasons for my visit. 
3. My doctor takes enough time to answer my questions. 
Response scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 3 = "neutral," 4 = "agree," 5 = "strongly agree" 
Health Locus of Control [Item from Moorman and Matulich (1993)]: 
I have a lot of confidence in my ability to cure myself once I get sick. 
Response scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 3 = "neutral," 4 = "agree," 5 = "strongly agree" 
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TABLE A1 (Cont.): CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES 
Constructs and Measures [Source] 
Age: We use the standardized score of age. 
Education: 1 = "no formal education," 2 = "education up to age 12," 3 = "education up to age 14," 4 = "education 
up to age 18," 5 = "higher education," 6 = "university".  
Gender: 0  =  “female,”  1  =  "male" 
Income*: 1 = "up to [$2,000] per year," 2 = "between [$2,000] and [$4,999] per year," 3 = "between [$5,000] and 
[$9,999] per year," 4 = "between [$10,000] and [$19,999] per year," 5 = "between [$20,000] and [$39,999] per 
year,"  6  =  "between  [$40,000]  and  [$74,999],”  7  =  “more  than  [$75,000]  per  year” 
*Note: Income levels were converted into the currency of each country.  
Socioeconomic Status [Steenkamp, Van Heerde, & Geyskens (2010)]: If people in our society are divided into 
upper, upper middle, middle, lower middle, working, and lower classes, which class do you think you belong to? 
Response scale: 1 = "lower class," 2 = "working class," 3 = "lower middle class," 4 = "middle class," 5 = "upper 
middle class," 6 = "upper class".  
Relationship  Quality  (α  =  .83) [Kao et al. (1998); Morgan & Hunt (1994)] 
Please read each of the statements below and indicate to what extent it describes your own experience with your 
doctor. 
1. I trust that my doctor keeps personally sensitive medical information private. 
2. I  trust  my  doctor’s  judgment  about  my  medical  care. 
3. I trust that my doctor performs necessary medical tests and procedures regardless of cost. 
4. I trust that my doctor performs only medically necessary tests and procedures. 
5. The relationship I have with my doctor is something I am very committed to. 
6. The relationship I have with my doctor is something I intend to maintain indefinitely. 
Response scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree,"  3  =  "neutral,"  4  =  "agree,"  5  =  "strongly  agree” 
Age Homophily [Own Development]: -1*[ Standardized score of the difference, in absolute value, between the 
patient and the physician's age] 
Gender Homophily [Own Development]: 1 = patient and physician of the same gender, and 0 = otherwise 
Relationship Duration [Own Development]: Standardized score of the relationship duration in years. 
Interaction Frequency [Own Development]: How regularly do you visit your doctor? 
Response scale: 1 = "usually less than once every two years ,"2 = "at least once every two years ,"3 = "at least once 
a year," 4 = "usually once every six months,"5 = "once every three months,"6 = "once every month,"7 = "every 
other week," 8 = "once a week or  more”.   
Time Since Last Visit [Own Development]: When was your last visit to your doctor? 
Response scale: 1 = "less than one month ago,"2 = "one to three months ago,"3 = "four to six months ago,"4 = 
"seven months to one year ago,"5 = "more than one year ago".  
Consumer  Medical  Knowledge  (ρ  =  .77)  [Stremersch et al. (2003)]: Regarding medical treatment of diseases you 
consider  yourself… 
1. 1  =  “not  at  all  knowledgeable,”  to  5  =  “very  knowledgeable” 
2. 1  =  “not  at  all  experienced,”  to  5  =  “very  experienced” 
Health Status [PCAS;;  Safran  et  al.  (1998)]:  In  general,  would  you  say  your  health  is… 
1 = "poor," 2 = "fair," 3 = "good," 4 = "very good," 5 = "excellent".  
Health  Motivation  (ρ  =  .60)  [Moorman & Matulich (1993)]: Please read each of the statements below and indicate 
how much you agree with each of them: 
1. I try to prevent health problems before I feel any symptoms. 
2. I try to protect myself against health hazards I hear about. 
Response scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 3 = "neutral," 4 = "agree," 5 = "strongly agree" 
Perceived  Doctor  Expertise  (ρ  =  .82)  [Brown et al. (1995)]: Please read each of the statements below and indicate 
to what extent it describes your own experience with your doctor. 
1. My doctor is very competent and well-trained. 
2. I usually get good advice from my doctor. 
Response scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 3 = "neutral," 4 = "agree," 5 = "strongly agree" 
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TABLE A2: SCALE RELIABILITIES PER COUNTRY 
 
Country N UNA* RNA* EIFE* CIIE* QC*  RQ* CMK** HM**  PDE**  
Belgium 669 .815 .817 .803 .703 .898 .782 .774 .628 .807 
Brazil 785 .864 .864 .788 .674 .858 .791 .840 .501 .793 
Canada 540 .830 .871 .841 .721 .896 .881 .788 .550 .843 
Denmark 570 .777 .828 .830 .754 .916 .829 .752 .624 .777 
Estonia 523 .792 .778 .842 .660 .839 .807 .779 .575 .765 
France 776 .775 .820 .823 .711 .875 .818 .672 .442 .842 
Germany 783 .824 .872 .888 .753 .926 .822 .911 .595 .809 
India 521 .853 .909 .824 .706 .817 .850 .640 .547 .810 
Italy 818 .862 .853 .842 .724 .897 .876 .722 .528 .830 
Japan 758 .846 .900 .770 .819 .830 .828 .645 .659 .691 
Poland 760 .873 .873 .840 .721 .916 .775 .830 .755 .816 
Portugal 524 .877 .863 .856 .716 .892 .864 .784 .524 .829 
Singapore 815 .895 .880 .803 .701 .898 .865 .761 .677 .844 
Switzerland 547 .785 .837 .821 .716 .877 .786 .757 .549 .796 
The Netherlands 795 .766 .820 .812 .770 .900 .851 .717 .625 .826 
United Kingdom 781 .840 .870 .841 .726 .903 .879 .785 .532 .845 
United States 770 .824 .889 .816 .728 .900 .869 .784 .660 .828 
Pooled 11,735 .844 .870 .833 .736 .892 .833 .765 .595 .822 
Nr Items: 4 5 4 3 3 6 2 2 2 
Acronyms: UNA = Unintentional Non-Adherence; RNA = Reasoned Non-Adherence. EFIE = Expert Facilitation of Informational Empowerment; CIIE = 
Customer-Initiated Informational Empowerment; DE = Decisional Empowerment. QC = Communication Quality. RQ = Relationship Quality. CMK = 
Consumer Medical Knowledge. HM = Health Motivation. PDE = Perceived Doctor Expertise. 
* For multi-item  scales  with  more  than  two  items  we  report  Cronbach’s  alpha  as  our  measure  of  scale  reliability.   
** For two-item  scales  we  report  Pearson’s  correlation  coefficient  as  our  measure of scale reliability. 
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TABLE A3: CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF FACTOR LOADINGS BETWEEN 
METRIC INVARIANCE AND CONFIGURAL MODELS 
 
Country 
Percentage of Loadings in the Metric 
Invariance within the  
95% CI of the Configural Model 
Belgium 80% 
Brazil 85% 
Canada 85% 
Denmark 50% 
Estonia 70% 
France 75% 
Germany 70% 
India 70% 
Italy 75% 
Japan 65% 
Poland 55% 
Portugal 80% 
Singapore 50% 
Switzerland 75% 
The Netherlands 70% 
United Kingdom 80% 
United States 80% 
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TABLE A4 (Part 1 of 2): COUNTRY-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Construct Belgium Brazil Canada Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
UNA 2.00 .67 2.03 .77 2.12 .67 
RNA 1.63 .66 1.65 .73 1.68 .74 
EFIE 3.70 .72 3.96 .73 3.55 .84 
CIIE 3.80 .68 3.99 .70 3.73 .69 
DE 2.01 .99 1.86 1.03 2.24 1.05 
Relationship Quality 4.07 .52 4.08 .58 3.98 .66 
Consumer Medical Knowledge 3.34 .89 3.31 1.07 3.29 .91 
Health Motivation 3.54 .81 3.89 .85 3.84 .68 
Doctor Expertise 4.37 .56 4.53 .54 4.26 .68 
Construct Denmark Estonia France Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
UNA 1.75 .56 2.11 .60 2.03 .68 
RNA 1.43 .56 2.09 .75 1.61 .66 
EFIE 3.36 .87 3.08 .91 3.61 .80 
CIIE 3.82 .73 3.37 .73 3.71 .75 
DE 1.91 1.04 1.94 .99 1.64 .89 
Relationship Quality 3.91 .59 3.93 .58 4.00 .57 
Consumer Medical Knowledge 3.37 .90 2.93 .90 3.52 .86 
Health Motivation 3.48 .85 3.67 .87 3.47 .82 
Doctor Expertise 4.26 .67 3.91 .76 4.29 .68 
Construct Germany India Italy Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
UNA 2.06 .67 2.41 .79 2.06 .75 
RNA 1.67 .73 2.07 .90 1.83 .78 
EFIE 3.70 .90 3.70 .73 3.40 .86 
CIIE 3.83 .73 3.65 .70 3.76 .72 
DE 2.09 1.01 1.79 .92 2.02 1.01 
Relationship Quality 4.00 .61 3.92 .60 3.71 .70 
Consumer Medical Knowledge 3.33 .93 3.38 .90 3.58 .81 
Health Motivation 3.46 .79 3.95 .73 3.64 .78 
Doctor Expertise 4.31 .68 4.24 .68 3.91 .80 
Acronyms: UNA = Unintentional Non-Adherence; RNA = Reasoned Non-Adherence; EFIE = Expert Facilitation of 
Informational Empowerment; CIIE = Customer-Initiated Informational Empowerment; DE = Decisional 
Empowerment.  
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TABLE A4 (Part 2 of 2): COUNTRY-SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Construct Japan The Netherlands Poland Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
UNA 2.39 .64 1.85 .61 2.12 .74 
RNA 1.81 .74 1.42 .57 1.90 .76 
EFIE 3.45 .63 3.51 .75 3.46 .86 
CIIE 3.42 .71 3.53 .72 3.56 .75 
DE 1.85 .77 2.35 1.03 1.62 1.00 
Relationship Quality 3.65 .51 3.87 .57 3.67 .62 
Consumer Medical Knowledge 3.22 .90 3.29 .88 3.28 1.02 
Health Motivation 3.49 .75 3.46 .74 3.76 .91 
Doctor Expertise 3.71 .67 4.11 .68 4.07 .74 
Construct Portugal Singapore Switzerland Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
UNA 2.12 .73 2.49 .71 2.04 .62 
RNA 1.75 .70 2.20 .74 1.67 .66 
EFIE 3.71 .81 3.58 .63 3.83 .77 
CIIE 3.97 .63 3.64 .59 3.96 .66 
DE 1.85 1.00 2.20 1.01 2.28 1.00 
Relationship Quality 3.86 .66 3.75 .51 4.05 .55 
Consumer Medical Knowledge 3.29 .83 3.04 .76 3.49 .83 
Health Motivation 3.86 .74 3.93 .65 3.58 .80 
Doctor Expertise 4.23 .68 4.03 .60 4.38 .60 
Construct United Kingdom United States Mean SD Mean SD 
UNA 1.96 .70 2.11 .74 
RNA 1.50 .67 1.74 .80 
EFIE 3.49 .84 3.72 .78 
CIIE 3.60 .71 3.89 .68 
DE 1.91 .99 2.48 1.11 
Relationship Quality 3.98 .64 4.09 .61 
Consumer Medical Knowledge 3.34 .93 3.50 .90 
Health Motivation 3.70 .71 3.92 .71 
Doctor Expertise 4.33 .68 4.38 .65 
Acronyms: UNA = Unintentional Non-Adherence; RNA = Reasoned Non-Adherence; EFIE = Expert Facilitation of 
Informational Empowerment; CIIE = Customer-Initiated Informational Empowerment; DE = Decisional 
Empowerment.  
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